The multi-armed bandit is a natural means of representing customer switching in response to "noisy" quality or value. The complexity of many choice models makes them difficult to work with analytically in the bandit setting, however. While there exist stylized models that are more tractable, their ability to represent actual choice behavior has not been thoroughly examined.
Introduction
In many business contexts, customers repeatedly switch among suppliers. This is often observed in service industries, where switching behavior is called customer "defection" or "churn." It is also a common phenomenon in the context of consumer products, where brand switching is a widely studied phenomenon. Among the factors responsible for switching behavior is random variation in the utility or value that a customer obtains each time he or she patronizes a supplier, and problems involving switching in response to random variation in supplier quality have usefully been modeled as so-called multi-armed bandits.
While multi-armed bandits are a natural means of representing discrete-choice problems with learning, they are difficult to work with analytically, and their intractability raises two sets of questions.
For actors faced with bandit problems, an understanding of optimal choice behavior, or near-optimal heuristics, is important. For those who are, effectively, one of the "arms" in another actor's bandit problem, an understanding of how people make choices in a bandit setting is essential. The focus of our interest is the latter.
In this paper we consider how well positive models of discrete choice fit subjects choices in infinite horizon, discounted, two-armed Bernoulli bandit problems. These models have been proposed in a variety of disciplines, including decision analysis, marketing, and operations management. In Section 2 we review the literature related to the proposed models and their tests, and in Section 3 we formally define two sets of models to be analyzed.
One set includes three models that represent successive approximations of an a normative analysis of the problem. The first of these is a Gittins-index model, which posits that subjects make choices that maximize the expected discounted value of their winnings and use Bayes's rule to incorporate learning from past experience. The next, is a myopic analogue to the Gittins-index rule, on in which subjects are Bayesian but choose to maximize the expected value of their next choice. The last model, which we call Simple, further reduces the model of myopic behavior by assuming that subjects categorize arms as either "good' or "bad."
The other of models set includes three related models of choice that are found in the literature on statistical learning and decision-making under uncertainly. The first of these is version of the myopic rule, described above, in which subjects remember the outcome of only the last n trials. A further simplification is a "Hot Hand" rule which represents subjects staying with the current arm until it loses in n consecutive trials. The last is an "Exponential Smoothing" model in which subjects' update their belief about the quality of an arm by taking a weighted average of the past belief and the current outcome.
We view these models as representing different tradeoffs between analytical tractability and richness of the representation of the learning process. To the extent that simpler, more tractable models adequately capture customer choice behavior, they may be valuably used in competitive analysissuch as that performed in Hall and Porteus [20] , Gans [11] , and Gaur and Park [13] -which links supplier quality decisions to their market outcomes.
We use experiments to test the performance of the models, and we analyze the models in two ways.
First, we consider a prediction that is generally consistent across the representations: the expected switching time -the expected number of trials that a subject consecutively samples from a given arm before switching to an alternative -should be increasing and convex in the expected payout of that arm. Second, we distinguish among the various models' ability to predict subjects' behavior, choice by choice. The experimental procedure is described in Section 4.
Our findings, presented in Sections 5 and 6, are as follows. First, estimates of the expected number of trials appear to be increasing and convex in the expected payout of an arm. Second, simpler and analytically more tractable models of choice provide the best fit to subjects observed choices. In contrast, the complex Gittins-index model, which maximizes expected discounted rewards, fared most poorly in tests of model fit.
Among all models, a variant of the Hot Hand provided the best fit to subjects' actual choices, as judged by Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) scores. Additional analysis suggests, however, that the model's strong performance is an artifact of the relatively low rate of switching among arms displayed by subjects.
In contrast, other analytically tractable models do appear to display this artifact. Among these, the Exponential Smoothing model also fit the observed particularly well. Within the hierarchy of models that are derived from the Gittins index, the Simple model's random-walk representation of choice also performed well. Given this combination of simplicity and robustness, we would favor using Exponential Smoothing and Simple models in competitive analysis. These conclusions are discussed in Section 7.
Literature Review
Bandit-like models have proven to be useful in a wide variety of contexts. Classic examples include clinical drug trials and petroleum exploration. For example, see Gittins [17] , Banks et al. [3] , and
Anderson [1] . The framework is also useful in a consumer product or service context. For example, see Meyer and Shi [30] and Erdem and Keane [9] . For a fuller description of the multi-armed bandit problem, please see Appendix A.
Because of its importance in many different fields, normative aspects of the multi-armed bandit problem have received considerable attention over the years, and we briefly describe highlights of work devoted to the infinite-horizon, discounted version of the problem that is addressed in this paper.
Perhaps most widely known is the work of Gittins and Jones [15] who proved the following: from each arm's Markov chain and current state an index may be calculated, and at any stage it is optimal to choose the arm with the highest index. Gittins [16] went on to develop explicit expressions for this socalled Gittins index, though in the context of Bayesian bandits the index has proven to be tremendously difficult to calculate. In turn, Chang and Lai [8] developed approximations to the Gittins index for Bayesian bandits (with arms that are members of exponential families of distributions), which they proved to be asymptotically optimal as the discount rate approaches one, so that the decision-maker samples infinitely before switching away from an arm. See also Brezzi and Lai [4] .
Difficulty in calculating optimal choices has also led to suggestions for simpler, heuristic solutions to the bandit problem. An early paper by Schmalensee [31] analyzes the use of Bush and Mosteller's [6] linear learning model for solving the problem. In the computer science literature, various other forms of reinforcement learning have been applied to the problem as well. For example, see Sutton and Barto [32] .
This difficulty also naturally leads one to wonder how well people actually solve bandit problems. Surprisingly, however, there is relatively little positive work that investigates how people make choices in bandit settings. In particular, we are aware of only four such papers. Horowitz [22] , Meyer and Shi [30] and Banks et al. [3] use Bernoulli bandits, whose arms have simple win-lose payout distributions. Anderson [1] uses arms with more complex payout distributions, such as simulated dice rolls and normally-distributed rewards.
Results from these studies suggest that people's behavior is roughly consistent with predictions for the Bayesian model, but with important and systematic deviations. Horowitz [22] and Meyer and Shi [30] offer exploratory analyses, using experimental data to generate hypotheses concerning the heuristics used by subjects. Both papers find that subjects' choices reflect a Bayesian updating of priors, but also a bias toward choices that are more myopic than are optimal. Horowitz [22] also finds that subjects over-sample from inferior arms (over-experiment), a bias which is distinct from that of myopic behavior. Banks et al. [3] and Anderson [1] devise experiments that provide sharp tests of specific hypotheses concerning the presence of certain heuristics or biases in choice behavior.
Anderson [1] finds that subjects experiment less than optimally and provides evidence that risk aversion associated with more diffuse priors is the likely cause of the effect. Banks et al. [3] manipulate the arms' prior distributions so that, in some cases, optimal choice behavior is myopic, and in others it is not, and they find that subjects' behavior is consistent with these normative predictions.
The intent of our analysis differs from the work described above, however. Rather than using the data either in an inductive fashion, to propose new models of choice, or to construct sharp tests of hypotheses concerning specific biases away from expected utility maximizing behavior, we take an "engineer's" view of the problem. Our aim is to identify models of choice behavior that are simple enough to be useful in the context competitive analysis, and we judge a model's value along two dimensions: analytical tractability, as well as ability to roughly represent the choices that a wide variety of people make.
Hutchinson and Meyer [24] suggest that a formal positive theory of sequential choice is likely include combinations of simple rules or strategies, each of which optimizes a limited or restricted version of the task at hand. In this context, one may view our analysis as explicitly considering the efficacy of various simple policies, while putting off the larger issue of how people use the rules in concert.
Our approach is similar in spirit to recent work in the economics literature by Harless and Camerer [21] and Camerer and Ho [7] . In the former, the authors consider generalizations of expected utility theory along two dimensions: "fit" with the observed data, as well as "parsimony." In the latter, the authors apply tools from marketing research to judge the fit of models' to subjects' choices in experiments, much as one would fit brand choice models to panel data.
The models we test come from a variety of sources. In addition to the original and myopic variants of the Gittins-index model, referred to above, we test a related random-walk model that is proposed in Gans [11] . We consider a variant of the "Hot Hand" model described by Gilovich et al. [19] , a special case of which was used in Hall and Porteus [20] . We also test the classic model of exponential smoothing, which was fist developed in the early 1960's (for example, see Brown and Meyer [5] ), introduced into the marketing literature in Guadagni and Little [18] , and more recently proposed as a choice model in March [28] and in Gaur and Park [13] . In Section 3 we formally define these models and review this literature in more detail.
The Bandit Problem and Choice Models
In this section we formally define the multi-armed bandit problem addressed in this paper, as well as the models of choice that we will test. For background on the bandit problem, please see Appendix A.
The Multi-Armed Bandit
The multi-armed bandit problem used in our study is defined as follows. There exist m arms, indexed i = 1, . . . , m. When sampled, arm i yields a randomly distributed reward (or value or utility) with fixed distribution, U i . Formally, we describe U i as uniquely defined by a parameter θ ∈ Θ and as having cumulative distribution function F (u|θ), so that
The subject must repeatedly choose among the m arms, and we t = 1, 2, . . . be the time index of her choices. While she knows that each arm has a fixed distribution θ i ∈ Θ, she does not know what the various θ i 's are. Her task is to repeatedly choose among the arms in a way that maximizes the aggregate value of her choices.
Let a policy π = {π(1), π(2) . . .} be a sequence of choices of arms, and let Π be the class of policies that is nonanticipating with respect to future rewards. Then we formally define the subject's problem as that of finding (and executing) a policy, π ∈ Π, that will maximize the expected discounted value of the future stream of rewards, sup π∈Π E π ∞ t=1 α t U t , where α ∈ (0, 1) is the one-period discount rate.
The Gittins Index for the Bayesian Bandit and Related Models
A Bayesian subject may view each arm's θ i as a random variable with support on Θ. For arm i she maintains a cumulative distribution function P i t (θ) that represents her understanding at time t of the quality distribution, θ i ∈ Θ, under which she believes the arm to be operating. Let {P 1 0 , . . . , P m 0 } be the "prior" information the subject has before she begins her sequence of choices.
After each round of the game, the Bayesian subject uses the new sample, U t , and Bayes's rule to update this belief. Specifically, if she uses arm i at time t and receives reward u, then her new belief distribution will be
If she does not sample from i, then dP i t (θ) = dP i t−1 (θ) ∀ θ ∈ Θ.
Gittins Index Model
The so-called Gittins index of arm j describes the expected discounted reward per unit of expected discounted time,
where T is a stopping time with respect to the history of the process through time t − 1. The notation,
, emphasizes the fact that the marginal (subjective) distribution of value at (s−1) is a function of the distribution of the subject's belief at the time. To maximize her expected discounted reward, a subject should choose the arm with the largest Gittins index, i = arg max j {G(P j t−1 )}. (See Gittins and Jones [15] and Gittins [16] .)
Myopic Model
In practice, T and the Gittins index are extremely difficult to compute. In contrast, a myopic customer significantly simplifies the determination of her preferred arm by ignoring the option of future switching. For each arm j she more simply calculates the expected discounted reward, given she remains on arm j for all time,
She then chooses the arm i that maximizes this long-run expected reward: i = arg max j {M (P j t )}. From the right hand side of (3), we see that this is equivalent to choosing the arm that maximizes her expected reward at t.
Like her "rational" counterpart, the myopic subject uses the reward realized at i and Bayes's rule (1) to calculate her posterior beliefs, P i t+1 , concerning i's quality distribution. Again, for all j = i, P 
Simple Model
The Simple subject also uses (3) to myopically choose the arm that maximizes expected reward. Rather than maintaining a complex set of beliefs concerning arms, however, she partitions the arms' possible quality levels into two categories -good and bad -with respective reward distributions
and F B ≡ F (u|θ B ). That is, she further simplifies the choice process of the Myopic subject by reducing the set of distributions that she recognizes to be Θ = {θ B , θ G }. In turn, P i t , the prior distribution she maintains for each arm's θ i , collapses to be p i t , the probability that i is good rather than bad. Thus, rather than judging how good or bad an arm is, the subject's problem is more simply to decide whether an arm is good or bad.
. Using (3) we can define the index used by the Simple subject in terms that are exactly analogous to M (P i t ):
Again, S(p i t ) is the expected reward of sampling from i at t. Then, given a realization, u, the Simple subject's use of Bayes's rule (1) to update the prior probability that i is good reduces to
Algebraic manipulation shows that the index defined by (4)- (5) is equivalent tõ
where X 0 = ln
is a log-likelihood that reflects the subject's initial belief concerning the proba-
dF B (Us) is the log-likelihood that the sth trial comes from a good arm, and 1{ · } is the indicator function. That is, S(p i t−1 ) > S(p j t−1 ) if and only ifS i t−1 >S j t−1 . Note that (6) is a random walk which has an intuitive interpretation. In it, X 0 is an initial level of satisfaction that a subject has for arm i. Each time a subject samples from i, her experience leads an immediate response to the quality of the interaction, X s . In turn, this immediate response is integrated into the subject's overall satisfaction with i in a straightforward, additive fashion: better outcomes increase and worse outcomes decrease overall satisfaction.
The Simple model was proposed in Gans [11] in the context of models of service competition. The mathematical structure of the indexS i t is identical to that of the model of "cumulative discrete choice" proposed in Gilboa and Pazgal [14] . For a more complete development and review of these models see Gans [11] .
Other Choice Models
The models described above are motivated by the behavioral findings in [3, 22, 30] , and they form a hierarchical family. Most complex is the Gittins-index model, which derives from the rational behavior of Bayesian subjects. Less complex is the Myopic model, and then least complex is the Simple model, which may be viewed as a categorical version of the Myopic model, as well as an additive, "random walk" index of a subject's satisfaction with a given arm.
There exist many other possible representations of choice under uncertainty that also can be tested in our Bandit setting. In this paper, we concentrate on three: a "Last-n" model, which is analogous to a Myopic model with limited memory of past trials; an "Exponential Smoothing" analogue to the Simple model; and a "Hot Hand" model that reacts to recent wins and losses on the currently sampled arm.
Last-n
The Last-n index uses only the results of the last n trials on a given arm. Formally, it is calculated in the same fashion as the Myopic index, the difference being that the Last-n index for an arm corresponds to a Myopic index in which only the previous n trials on that arm are remembered.
Although the model represents subjects as having limited memory of past events, in a significant sense its use is more demanding of subjects' memory than the related Myopic rule. More specifically, let k i (t) = t s=1 1{π(s) = i} be the number of times a subject has sampled arm i by time t, and let s i (k) = min{t | k i (t) = k} be the time of the k th sample from arm i. Then a subject that uses the Last-n model must always recall each of the last n samples on each arm; that is, given she has sampled j ≥ n times from arm i, she must recall samples {U s i (j−n+1) , . . . , U s i (j) }. In contrast, to update of the analogous Myopic index a subject need only recall the prior distribution, P i t−1 , along with the outcome at time t, U t .
Hot Hand
A subject that uses the Hot Hand (HH) model ascribes positive serial correlation to the trials of a repeated random sample. The rule's underlying premise is that an arm that has recently won is more likely (than average) to win again. 1 We define a "HH-n" rule in our experiments as follows. If the subject experiences n consecutive losses in the last n trials on an arm she should switch to the other arm; otherwise she should continue to sample from the current arm. Thus, another way of stating a HH-1 rule is "stick on a winner and switch on a loser." Similarly, a HH-n rule could be described as switch only on n consecutive losers.
Like the Last-n rule, the HH-n rule requires that a subject maintain a detailed record of the outcome of each of the last n trials on a given arm.
The HH-n family of rules differs significantly from the other rules that we test in two fundamental ways. First, as far as we can tell, it is only directly applicable to Bernoulli outcomes. While more outcomes with complex distributions could be reduced to Bernoulli trials by applying a thresholdso that outcomes above the threshold are considered to be wins and those below the threshold, losses -all of the other rules immediately generalize to arbitrarily complex distributions, without having to be transformed in this manner. Second, the HH-n family is not an index rule. All of the other rules that we test calculate an index for each arm and recommend that the subject sample from the arm with the higher index. In contrast, in the HH-n rule the decision to stay on or switch away from the current arm is based only on that arm's performance. Information concerning the past performance of alternative arms is not used at all in the switching decision.
We note that Hall and Porteus [20] use a variant of the HH-1 rule in their analysis of service competition. In this model, a customer that receives satisfactory service remains with the current supplier, while a customer that receives unsatisfactory service switches to a competitor with a fixed probability p.
Exponential Smoothing
Exponential smoothing is a weighted analogue of the Simple model's additive random walk. Formally, we define the Exponential Smoothing (ES) model as follows. At t = 0 the subject's prior estimate of the average reward to be gained by sampling from arm i is ES i (0). Then at each trial t, at which the subject samples from arm i, we let
where 0 < γ < 1. Again, for all j = i, ES j (t) = ES j (t − 1).
In contrast to the index for the Simple model,S i (t), for which each previous trial carries an equal weight, ES i (t) is more strongly affected by recent trials at i. To see this, again let s i (k) denote the 1 The name "hot hand" derives from basketball, in which there is a common belief that players have "hot" hands, so that their success probabilities in making free-throw attempts exhibit positive serial correlation. In the context of problems of repeated choice under uncertainty, we say a belief in the "hot hand" implies that a subject (erroneously)
believes that a future payout is (positively) serially correlated with recent performance. See Gilovich et al. [19] .
time index of the k th trial at arm i. Then, given arm i has been pulled j times by time t, we can
. Thus, for a fixed 0 < γ < 1, the weight of the s i (k) th trial at i declines geometrically (roughly exponentially) quickly with its with each new sample from i, hence the name exponential smoothing. The higher the weighting factor, γ, the more quickly the weight declines. For γ = 0, the index remains constant, ES i (t) = ES i (0) for all t.
Conversely, for γ = 1, a subject's index is defined by her most recent trial:
Exponential smoothing models have a long history of use in a number of fields related to learning.
An early reference from the forecasting literature is Brown and Meyer [5] . Guadagni and Little [18] is a well-known application from the marketing literature, which applies smoothing to a bandit-like brand choice problem. A recent example from the learning literature in psychology is March [28] , which uses simulation to analyze properties of smoothing models.
Of particular interest to us is a generalization of a smoothing model that appears in Gaur and Park [13] , a paper that analyzes service-level competition among inventory systems. Here outcomes are Bernoulli -either a customer order is filled or it is not -and the model is extended so that the smoothing constant, γ, may differ, depending on whether or not an order is filled. (This also echoes asymmetric elements of the stochastic learning models that date back to Bush and Mosteller [6] .)
It is also worth noting that the smoothing model is consistent with the belief that an arm's reward distribution is Markov modulated, rather than i.i.d. across trials. In this case, it can be shown that smoothing is analogous to the use of a Bayesian procedure in which prior trials' results are discounted. (For details, see Matsuda and Sekiguchi [29] .) In the context of our Bandit problems, one may interpret a subject's use of exponential smoothing as "not believing" that arms are i.i.d. and, therefore, discounting earlier sample information, since it is more likely to have been obtained from a reward distribution that differs from the one that is currently being sampled.
To better understand the how well these models apply to the bandit problem, we conduct two sets of tests. The first seeks to validate or refute a general prediction that is consistent across all models:
that the expected number of consecutive trials on an arm is increasing and convex in the average quality (reward) of the arm. The other is a more detailed discrimination among the models, based on the choices that the models defined above recommend. Before we provide the details of the tests, we describe the experimental setup.
Experimental Setup and Preliminary Results
To test the models of customer response, we have developed and run experiments in which subjects face the bandit problems described above. In this section we describe, in detail, how the experiments are structured and some descriptive statistics that give a general sense of the subjects' performance in the experiments.
The Value Distribution
The models we test are, ultimately, meant to represent customer switching due to variation in product or service quality. The hedonic nature of a these experiences is difficult to control or monitor, however.
For example, the same physical measures of service quality -such as speed, accuracy, or courtesymay be perceived or valued differently by different people.
Therefore, we operationalize differences in the perceived value with money; that is, the dollar reward received when sampling an arm is a proxy for the value received. This payment procedure is standard practice in experimental economics and is intended to induce participants to take their task seriously, since real money is at stake. (See Friedman and Sunder [10] .)
We define the payout distributions of the arms to be Bernoulli random variables: with probability P{i wins} arm i pays $0.10, and with probability P{i loses} = 1−P{i wins} it pays nothing. Note that the shifting or scaling of outcomes {$0.00, $0.10} does not affect the choices the models recommend. 2 Furthermore, the use of two-point payout distributions allows us to avoid problems associated with subject utilities that may vary nonlinearly with outcomes.
The Number and Nature of Arms
Each subject plays a series of three two-armed Bernoulli bandit problems. We will sometimes refer to each problem as one of three "sessions" in which each subject participates. Participants are informed that in each session each of the two arms has a fixed, but unknown, probability of winning; that is, the probability of success may vary from arm to arm, but will remain constant over time for a given arm.
Prior Information
Before they begin, participants do not know the two arms' probabilities of winning. We do, however, show participants some prior information about the arms. Specifically, we report (in writing) that each of the two arms has been sampled from three times and that two of the three trials were successes.
Given this information, subjects know that both arms have P{win} ∈ (0, 1), so they are not degenerate.
Subjects also know that the prior performance of the two arms is equivalent.
Discounting
Recall that the form of the Gittins-index result (2) for rational subjects depends on an infinite horizon setting with constant discounting. In experiments, a common method operationalizing a constant discount rate is to generate a constant probability (1 − α) that any given round of the experiment will be the last. In our experiment α = 0.99, and our instructions communicated to subjects that there would be a 1% chance that any given trial would be the last (equivalently, a 99% chance that it would not be the last).
To determine the number of trials to be run, we then implemented the randomized procedure only once, before any of the experiments were run, and we used the same three sample outcomes for all subjects: 95, 117, and 135 rounds. In this fashion, the procedure ensured that results would be directly comparable across participants.
Experimental Treatments
The experimental design involved three treatments, one for each of the three bandit problems each subject encountered. Treatments were run within-subject, counterbalanced. Thus, while each partic- This design allows us to test hypotheses about convexity by comparing the aggregate frequency of choices of an arm, given its win-rate. We can also test predictions of the three models at the individual level, since each participant saw all three pairs of arms.
Software-Based Implementation
The experiment was implemented via computer on a web page which could be accessed by a typical browser. Participants were told the web site's address, logged into the system, and played the game.
The bandit problems were implemented as the repeated choice between two colored decks of cards.
In each of the three sessions the success probabilities (0.15/0.40, 0.40/0.40, 0.40/0.65) and colors (red/blue, green/gray; yellow/purple) assigned to the two decks and their location on the screen (left and right) were randomly selected for each participant.
The decks were composed of cards that state "YOU WIN!" or "YOU LOSE!" and their compositions remained constant over time. Each time a subject chose one of the available decks, an animation played that showed the deck being shuffled, one card being chosen at random, and the outcome of the trial, win or lose. The card was then replaced, and the deck reverted to its initial state.
At all times subjects also saw the balance of their winnings as it accumulated at $0.10 per win.
Participants could click a "history" button, which would display summary statistics concerning total wins and losses, as well as the entire history of their choices and the resulting outcomes.
At the end of each of the three bandit problems, each subject answered a short questionnaire.
Demographic and other information was collected once the entire game had ended. Appendix B presents the entire set of instructions and participant views of the experiment.
All participants earned a $5 participation fee plus their accumulated earnings from the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were informed of their total earnings and asked to print a receipt from their browsers. They brought the receipt to an assistant, who checked it against their ID, obtained their signature and paid them their earnings.
Data Collected
Three-hundred and seventy-three participants logged onto the system. Of these, 227 completed the experiment. Thus we have collected data on 347 (95+117+135) choices times 227 participants = 78,769 choices between two options.
For each of the 227 participants, we have a complete record of each of three treatments of the bandit problem, as well as answers to end-of-treatment and end-of-experiment questions. An example of one session of a subject is shown in Figure 1 .
Descriptive Statistics
Of the 227 subjects that completed the experiment, 32 had at least one session in which the last "run" -a set of consecutive trials on a given arm -is the only run on that arm. In these cases, the sole run on that arm is artificially truncated by the end of the experiment, and tests for the convexity of the average run length become difficult to perform. We have therefore excluded these subjects from our tests of convexity and of model fit, and our final data set includes 195 subjects, 347 trials per subject, for a grand total of 67,665 recorded choices.
The 195 subjects took, on average, 12 minutes and 53 seconds to complete all three sessions, or about 2.2 seconds per decision. As they moved from the first to the last session, subjects also took less time to make each decision. This may be due either to learning of the experimental setup or to boredom or fatigue.
Subjects' payoffs from the sessions ranged between $17.50 and $23.50, with an average of $20.50.
In comparison, if a decision-maker were to repeatedly choose an arm at random, her expected winnings would be $19.73, and if she were to choose the better arm in every trial, her expected earnings would be $22. 26. 3 Thus, the relative flatness of the reward curve means that the incentive to make the "best" decision on each choice is not strong. At the same time, the relatively low reward per choice allowed us to track each subject for 347 choices and provided us with ample data to fit our models. That is, we have opted to be able to better track subjects who may be paying less strict attention to the optimization of their choice. We also considered how summary statistics varied across experimental conditions. For each subject, we calculated the average run length in a given session, the total number of trials (95, 117, or 135) divided by the total number of runs in that session, and compared average run lengths across the different arm conditions. When both arm probabilities were equal (0.40/0.40) the average run length was the smallest, at 7.6. Average run length was 8.6 when the choice was 0.15/0.40 and 13.3 when the choice was 0.40/0.65. On average, subjects also took slightly more time -about 0.1 seconds more per round -to complete the sessions when the two arms' probabilities were the same (0.40/0.40), rather than different (0.15/0.40 or 0.40/0.65). Thus, when the arms' winning probabilities were the same, so there was no clear best arm, there was more switching and subjects spent more time per trial.
Longer run lengths and times per arm were also positively correlated with total earnings. Ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression of subjects' earnings on average run length (defined asτ in §5) and on average time per trial showed that a one-unit increase in average run length was associated with a $0.07 average increase in total winnings, and a one-minute increase in total completion time (equivalently, a 0.173 second increase in time per round) was associated with a $0.03 average increase in total winnings. 4 Of course, the fact that larger run lengths were associated with higher earnings may reflect the fact that subjects tended to stay on "better" arms for longer runs.
Finally, we calculated the same descriptive statistics for the subjects who were excluded from our main analyses. The 32 subjects who completed the experiment (but had a single, truncated run on a given arm) spent about 4 minutes less total time (about 0.7 seconds less per decision) on average and won approximately the same amount as other subjects. Subjects who did not finish the experiment spent about 0.2 seconds more time per decision and won about $0.0015 less per decision than the 195 subjects included in our analyses.
The Expected Switching Time
Suppose that at some arbitrary period, t, a subject has last sampled from arm i, and let τ be the number of additional periods that she will continue to sample from i, before switching to a competitor. A test of this property is interesting to us for two reasons. First, it is a basic check of whether or not subjects' actual behavior corresponds to a prediction that is common to many models. Second, if true the increasing-convex property is also consistent with a broader claim which is made in the popular management literature: that marginal increases in service quality can have increasingly dramatic benefits in customer loyalty and lifetime value. (For example, see Jones and Sasser [25] .) Therefore, our first set of tests focuses on E[τ ]. 4 R 2 = 0.15 in the regression, and both coefficients were significant at the 0.05 level.
Estimation
In constructing tests for monotonicity and convexity, we control the quality of the arm and measure the resulting switching times. In the context of Bernoulli arms, P{win} is the measure of quality, and in the experiments, every subject plays three pairs of arms with the same probabilities of winning: 
where i = l for the left arm and i = r for the right.
We test thatτ is increasing and convex in P{win} as follows. Letτ p,j be the average run length for an arm with P{win} = p and subject j. For each subject we first calculate the first difference between adjacent quality pairs: ∆ 1,j (τ ) =τ 0.40,j −τ 0.15,j and ∆ 2,j (τ ) =τ 0.65,j −τ 0.40,j . Given the experimental setup, we know that these sample differences are independent across subjects, and we use the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to check that the median of the differences is greater than zero.
(For example, see Lehmann [27] .) Our test for convexity runs along the same lines. Here we define each subject's second difference as ∆ 2 j (τ ) = ∆ 2,j (τ ) − ∆ 1,j (τ ), and we check that it is positive. Note that there exist two potential problems associated with usingτ i as an estimate of E[τ ]. First, subjects' last runs are censored. For example, from Figure 1 we see that Subject 32's last run consists of trials 134 and 135 on the right arm. At this point, the experimental treatment was ended. Had the subject been allowed to continue sampling, the run length might have been longer than two, however.
A second potential problem concerns the possibility that the sequence of run lengths is not stationary.
For example, the sequence of run lengths may be (stochastically) increasing or decreasing, rather than stationary. Indeed, our results suggest that over the course of a session there is a mild increase in run lengths. 5 The overall impact of these effects is not immediately clear to us. On the one hand, the length of the censored run is longer than what was recorded. In this sense, censoring biases the average downward. On the other hand, there is an inspection bias present: runs that are censored are likely to be longer than average. Even if run lengths are not stationary, to the extent that τ is stochastically 5 On average, the number of switches decreased from 12.65 in the first half of each session to 9.97 in the second half, a reduction of about 21%.
increasing the quality of the arm, then these sample averages should be increasing in quality as well.
Nevertheless, there are modifications that can correct for the problem.
One simple alternative, which we denoteτ , eliminates the last, truncated run from the calculation of the sample average run length. As with theτ p,j 's, we can use subjects'τ p,j 's to calculate ∆ 1,j (τ ), ∆ 2,j (τ ), and ∆ 2 j (τ ) and use the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to check for the increasing and convex properties.
A second alternative tests for convexity of a single run, starting in a given trial of the session, and we measure the length of the run that begins at trial one, which we call τ 1 . By choosing the first round, we ensure that runs are not truncated. (The only subjects whose first runs are truncated are those that never change arms.) The choice of the first round also ensures that all subjects have exactly the same information about the arms as the run begins, so that the nonstationarity of run lengths that results from experience or informational differences is eliminated.
In many respects, the second alternative is preferable. It has the drawback, however, of not allowing for the within-subject comparisons across the three arms' qualities. This is because, given our randomization scheme, the success probability of the arm first chosen by a subject is not controllable.
When faced with 0.15/0.4 or 0.4/0.65 treatments, many subjects (unknowingly) first chose the arm that had a probability of winning of 0.40.
Results
While we have calculated relevant statistics for all three measures of run length, Figure 2 displays confidence intervals only forτ and τ 1 . Because the results forτ are similar to those forτ we omit their graphical display. The right panel of Figure 2 shows the results for the single run that starts at the first trial. Here, we do not have paired data across the three treatment conditions. Furthermore, the numbers of subjects for which we have results varies across the conditions: for P{win} = 0.15 the number of subjects is n = 106; for 0.40, n = 379; and for 0.65, n = 100. In this case, the point estimate of the average length appears to be convex, though not increasing from a P{win} of 0.15 to 0.40. Furthermore, the relatively smaller sample sizes for P{win} of 0.15 and 0.65 result in confidence intervals that are much wider than that for P{win} of 0.40.
Although the lack of pairing of the data makes it more difficult to test for convexity, we can use a Mann-Whitney test (also known as the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test; see Lehmann [27] ) to see whether or not the medians are increasing from one treatment condition to the next. While τ 1 is not significantly increasing from 0.15 to 0.40, it is increasing from 0.40 to 0.65, as well as over the whole range, 0.15 to 0.65. 6 In summary, the results of this section are generally consistent with the hypothesis that E[τ ] is increasing and convex in the quality of an arm. While each estimate has particular weaknesses, taken together they confirm that this fundamental prediction is consistent with subjects' actual behavior.
Estimating the Models' Fit to the Data
In this section, we consider the complementary question of distinguishing among the various models' fits to the data. We begin the section by describing how the models of Section 3 are applied to the experimental data and how we calculate the indices associated with each of the models. We then describe our estimation procedures in fitting subjects' choices. Finally, we compare how well the models fit subjects' actual choices.
Our results show that variants of the Hot Hand and Exponential Smoothing model appear to provide the best in-sample fits, both on an aggregate and a subject-by-subject basis. Similarly, among the hierarchy of Gittins-index derived models, the Simple model performed best. Thus there exist 6 The p-values were as follows: 0.34 for τ1 increasing as P{win} increases from 0.15 to 0.40; and 0.02 for τ1 increasing as P{win} increases from 0.40 to 0.65 and from 0.15 to 0.65. models that provide both analytical tractability and a reasonable fit to subjects' observed choices.
Calculating the Models' Indices
We first describe how the models' indices are calculated in the context of the experiment's Bernoulli outcomes.
Gittins-Index Model
For the Gittins-index model (2), we use results from Gittins [17] that explicitly calculate Gittins indices, G, for Bernoulli bandits with conjugate (Beta-distributed) priors. Specifically, given a Betadistributed prior, a discount rate, α, and numbers of wins and losses prior to t, ω i t−1 and i t−1 , the index for an arm is a function of the triple (α, ω i t−1 , i t−1 ). Table 11 in [17] lists G(α, ω i t−1 , i t−1 ) for arms in which α = 0.99 and ω i t−1 and i t−1 range from 1 to 40. 7 In calculating each arm's Gittins index for any experimental trial, we assume the prior is Beta distributed and use the results from Gittins [17] . Given the prior information we communicate to subjects -that α = 0.99 and that both arms had won twice and lost once in three prior trials -we further assume that (α = 0.99, ω i 0 = 2, i 0 = 1). After each choice of an arm and outcome, that arm's ω t or t is updated and its G recalculated.
Note that the use of Beta-distributed priors is purely for computational tractability, and in the experimental sessions we did not inform subjects that the prior distribution was of this form. Thus, our experiment does not provide a sharp test of whether or not subjects are rational. Rather it tests how well the "rational model" with the given Beta prior fits subjects' choices. This is in keeping with our original aim of validating models for use in the context of competitive analysis. To emphasize the distinction between a test for rationality and a test for model fit, we call the model "Gittins" (rather than "Rational") when we report our experimental results.
Furthermore, even if we had informed subjects, in words or through pictures, that the prior is of a Beta (ω i 0 = 2, i 0 = 1) form, neither the prior distribution nor the discount rate implicitly used by the subject is observable. In theory, we might manipulate ω i 0 , i 0 , and α to accommodate subjects' unobserved, idiosyncratic priors and discount rates. The result would be a generalized model with three free parameters, and we would search over all feasible triplets (α, ω i 0 , i 0 ) to find the initial parameters that generate the least inconsistency between model and experimental data. In practice, however, the calculation of the Gittins index is burdensome, and we have not attempted to search among this broader class of Gittins-index policies. [17] provides an approximation -equation (7.16), fitted with parameters from Tables 12-14 -that allows for calculation of indices that are typically precise within four decimal places. 8 There exist closed-form approximations to the Gittins index that could be used to fit idiosyncratic subject prior and discount-rate information. For example, see Chang and Lai [8] and Brezzi and Lai [4] . The expressions are not accurate
Myopic Model
For the Myopic model we, again, use Beta priors for convenience, and the resulting calculations are straightforward. Specifically, (3) does not require a discount rate, α, and given a Beta prior, the index is a straightforward function of previous wins and losses:
Given this form, it is not difficult to incorporate the effect of changes in the prior distribution on the indices.
Therefore, we test two versions of the myopic model. The first includes no free parameters and assumes (ω i 0 = 2, i 0 = 1). We call this the "Myopic-0" model. The second incorporates one free parameter. Specifically, we define a common ω i 0 for both arms and let it range between 0.01 and 2.99, in increments of 0.01. We then define a common i 0 = 3.0 − ω i 0 . Thus, the second version still requires that both arms have the same initial prior, but it allows the shape of the prior to vary. We call this model "Myopic-1."
Two elements of the parameter range are worth noting. First, to be consistent with the prior wins-loss information we report to subjects (2 wins in 3 prior trials), we bound ω i 0 away from 0 and 3, which respectively reflect beliefs that the probability of a win is zero and one. Second, by requiring ω i 0 + i 0 = 3.0, we fix the "strength" of the initial prior to be consistent with the quantity of prior information we report to subjects: the results of three prior trials. 9 
Simple Model
Recall that the Simple model hypothesizes that customers think of arms as being good or bad, with expected rewards of µ G and µ B . Algebraic manipulation (provided in Appendix E) demonstrates that we can write the index for arm i at time t as
the result of a series of ω i t−1 "up-steps" (U) and i t−1 "down-steps" (D). Furthermore, without loss of generality, we can normalize U ≡ 1. The result is a model with one free parameter, D.
For arm i with probability µ i (not necessarily µ G or µ B ) of winning, the expected "drift" of the random walkS at time t equals µ i U − (1 − µ i ) D. Given U and D, the minimal quality level required of i so that the drift is non-negative is
for discount rates that are significantly less than one, however. 9 This setup implicitly assumes that, before being informed of two successes in three prior trials, subjects have noninformative priors. An alternative, which we have not tested, would be to let ω and once a Simple subject begins sampling from an arm with µ i ≥ µ * , her expected switching time is infinite. (See Gans [12] .) When estimating the fit of subjects' choices with the Simple model, we systematically vary D so that µ * ranges from to 0.0033 to 0.99 in even increments of 0.0033.
We bound D away from zero so that the model is required to penalize arms for bad outcomes.
In contrast, for D = 0, the Simple model recommends an the arm with the greater number of wins -without regard to numbers of losses -and would provide (perhaps unfairly) good fits for subjects that never change arms, no matter how many losses. (For example, see the results for HH-n in §6.3.2, below.)
Last n
As with the previous models, for convenience we use Beta prior, so at trial t the index for arm i is the ratio of the number of wins and losses in the previous n trials on the arm. Formally, we let ω i t (n) and i t (n) be the number of wins and losses in the last n trials on arm i, so that ω i t (n) + i t (n) = n, and
While we have tested models for n = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, we report results only for n = 1, 3, 5. This allows the figures to be less cluttered and easier to read, and the omitted results (for n = 2, 4) are consistent with the broader trends seen across n = 1, 3, 5.
We have also tested a "meta" model which treats n as an additional free parameter and uses the n associated with each subject's lowest BIC score. The results of this meta-model are not fundamentally better than those of the basic Last-n family.
Finally, we note that, at t = 0 the Last-n model requires data for periods t = −1, −2, . . . , −n. For simplicity, we have initialized the record of these prior outcomes to all be wins. While this assumption is not consistent with the prior information shown to the subjects, it is consistent with the initial conditions required for fitting the Hot Hand family of models. (See below.) As we will see in the next subsection, differences in fit are substantial across models, and we do not believe that these initial conditions have significantly affected our results.
Hot Hand
Recall that the Hot Hand family of models uses only the results of the most recently sampled arm to decide which arm to sample next. Specifically, if the n previous trials on the current arm were all losses, then the HH-n model recommends switching to the other arm; otherwise the model recommends continuing to sample from the current arm.
While the Hot Hand rule is not index-based, when fitting the model to subjects' observed choices, it will be convenient for us to define it as an index rule. Therefore, we formally define HH-n indices as follows. For a subject that sampled from arm i at time (t − 1), we define the indices for arms i and j = i to be
where i t−1 (n) denotes the number of losses in the previous n contiguous trials on arm i. The rule then recommends choosing the arm with the larger of the two indices.
If a subject chooses an arm at time t that she had chosen in the previous trial, then i t (n) = i t−1 (n) + U − t. Because the counter i t−1 (n) only tracks the number of losses in the previous n contiguous trials on arm i, we reset i t−1 (n) = j t−1 (n) = 0 whenever the subject switches arms. This implies that HH-n recommends staying on the current arm whenever the current run on an arm is less than n trials.
Because the prior information we provide to subjects at the start of each session does not distinguish the order in which "prior" samples of the two arms were made, it is not well determined whether a subject's first trial in a given session represents a switch to a new arm or the continuation of a run on the current arm. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that the first trial represents a switch, and we reset the associated loss counters, i 0 (n) = j 0 (n) = 0, accordingly.
Exponential Smoothing
The Exponential Smoothing model (7) is implemented in a straightforward fashion. We test two versions of it.
The first model (ES-1) has the smoothing weight, γ, as its one free parameter. The initial index of each arm is fixed at ES i 0 = 2/3, so that it matches the win-loss ratio reported as prior information. Note that, for γ = 1, ES-1 corresponds to a Last-1 model, so to better distinguish between the two models, we bound γ away from 1. Similarly, for γ = 0, both arm's indices would equal 2/3 for all t and would not be informative. Therefore, we vary γ from 0.01 to 0.99 in increments of 0.01.
The second model (ES-2) also treats the initial index ES i
0 as a free parameter. In this case we vary both γ and ES i 0 from 0.01 to 0.99 in increments of 0.01, for a total of roughly 10,000 possible combinations of free parameter values.
Fitting the Models to Subjects' Choices
Let the generic index, I, represent the index of the model being used, and suppose that, at trial t in a given session, a model's indices are I l t and I r t for the left and right arms. If I l t > I r t , then a subject whose choices are dictated by the model will choose the left arm. In fact, at t, the subject will either choose the left arm or not, and a straightforward and readily observable measure of consistency would simply record whether or not the subject's choice matches the prediction or not.
An aggregate measure of consistency over all 347 trials would then be the total number of incorrect model predictions, the smaller the number the better. The determination of this number is trivial for the Gittins, Myopic-0, Last-n, and HH-n models, since they have no free parameters. For the Myopic-1, Simple, ES-1 and ES-2 models, one can search for the values of the respective free parameters that minimize the total number of errors across all 347 trials.
Alternatively, at any given trial one might further judge how well a subject's choice matches that prescribed by a model, rather than simply whether or not the observed choice is consistent. A common means of judging the degree of consistency is through the use of random utility models. (For example, see Anderson et al. [2] .) Here, one posits that the value of a left or right choice at a particular trial is randomly distributed and that only the mean of the distribution is captured by the model indices I l t and I r t . In the context of our experiments, the random fluctuation might be ascribed to errors (or "trembles") in judging the expected value of the choice.
If, from trial to trial, this random noise is independently and identically distributed according to a Gumble (double exponential) distribution then we have a so-called logit model. In this case, the probability of choosing the left arm at trial t is
Similarly, P {choose right} = 1 − P {choose left}.
Note that, by nesting the original choice models within the logit framework, we have imposed an additional (and unobservable) level of complexity, as well as the addition of a free parameter, β. The benefit is that we have a means of judging how well each observed choice matches a model's prediction.
Furthermore, that measure is a probability, and we can easily add the 347 choices' log-probabilities to calculate an aggregate log-likelihood (LL) of observing each subject's outcome. 10 A likelihood measure of consistency is particularly appealing in that it also lets us naturally correct for differences in the numbers of free parameters used by the models, something which is not easily accomplished when counting the total numbers of errors. We account for free parameters using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) BIC = −2LL+d.f.×ln(347), where d.f. is the numbers of degrees of freedom used by the model's free parameters. Indeed, BIC scores have the appealing property that they can be used to approximate Bayes factors, the posterior odds the data being explained by one non-nested model, rather than another. (See Kass and Raftery [26] .)
In contrast, a straightforward count of the number of inconsistent choices can become problematic if the index takes on only a few values. For example, in the extreme case that a choice model has I l t = I r t , regardless of a subject's observed choices and outcomes, the number of inconsistent choices is always equal to zero, and the model "perfectly" fits the observed data. In contrast, the likelihood 10 Our implementation of the Hot Hand model defines the index of the recommended arm as one and that of the other arm as zero. While this choice appears to be somewhat arbitrary, we note that it is without loss of generality, since the β of the superimposed logit model acts as an independent scaling factor. Therefore, the LL derived from the Hot Hand model is independent of the scale of its indices. (Thanks to Ed Kaplan for pointing this out.) approach would record that each choice is completely random (P{choose left} = P{choose left} = 0.5, without regard to β), and the associated BIC score would, more appropriately, suffer. For this reason, we emphasize results obtained from using the logit model. 11 The calculation of each model's LL requires the solution of a nonlinear optimization problem. For models with no free parameter, the LL is concave in β and the optimal β can be found using standard optimization software. While the LL's of the Myopic-1, Simple, and ES models are also concave in β, they are not necessarily jointly concave in β and their free parameters. Therefore, for these models, we perform a nested optimization procedure: the top level is a grid search over each model's original free parameters; then, for each of these grid values, we use a solver to find the optimal β and LL. We then record the best LL among all of the top-level grid values.
We implement this procedure for each subject to find one best set of free parameter values across all 347 trials. For each subject, we use the same free-parameter values across all three sessions. This approach reflects our assumption that each subject's parameters should be stable across treatment conditions, and it reduces the possibility of model overfitting.
Given the large qualities of data that we analyze, the use of BIC scores is also computationally appealing. In total, we have calculated more than 2 million scores for model fit -more than 10,500 free-parameter values associated with the various models for each of 195 subjects -and this task that has been facilitated by the straightforward optimization required for of log likelihood and BIC scores.
Results
For each of 195 subjects, we have used the optimization procedure described above to find free parameters that minimize each model's BIC score for each subject, and we report the fit results below.
Because of the large number of models considered, we report the results of the various models by family: first those that are derived from the Gittins index, then the Last-n group, then Hot Hand models, and finally Exponential Smoothing. More specifically, the curves in the figure's left panel represent cumulative distributions of BIC scores. 12 From the plot we see that Simple and Myopic-1, the models with an extra free parameter, nearly dominate Myopic-0 and Gittins, even after the BIC score penalizes these models for the added 11 We report results in the context of the models' BIC scores. For the Gittins-index family of models, we have also performed an analogous analysis using numbers of errors as the measure of fit, and the results are largely the same. 12 To derive a given model's curve we sort its 195 BIC scores from lowest to highest -that is, best to worst. Then we We can also judge the quality of fit at the individual level. For every subject, we rank each model's fit, by BIC score. Then for each model, we count the frequency of rankings across the 195 subjects.
Models Derived from the Gittins Index
The right panel of Figure 3 displays these results. We note that, in the figure, a tie for equal BIC scores results in all relevant policies receiving the higher rank. Thus, while each policy's rankings add up to n = 195, adding up a given ranking (e.g. 1 st place) across models may lead to a total that exceeds or falls short of 195.
The results show that, on a subject-by-subject basis, the Simple model fits the observed choices best most often, in about 41% of all subjects. Again, the Simple model has roughly twice the number of first place fits when compared to Myopic-0 or Myopic-1. In this case, however, the Myopic-0 model slightly outperforms Myopic-1.
We also performed pairwise comparisons of the models across subjects using paired-t and Wilcoxon
Signed Rank tests. In all but one case, the order was significant, with desired p-values vanishingly small. For the one-sided (alternative) hypothesis that the Myopic-1 BIC > Simple BIC, the results were somewhat less strong, however. Here, the t-test resulted in p-value of 0.08 while the signed rank plot the number of subjects with BIC scores less that or equal to each value listed on the x-axis. Models whose curves are farther "up and to the left" are interpreted as better fitting the observed data.
test a p-value of 0.11. 13
In summary, the analysis of BIC scores suggest that subjects' choices are much more consistent with myopic models of choice than with the more forward-looking Gittins index model. This is consistent with the previous findings described in the literature review. Of the myopic models, the analytically more tractable Simple model outperforms the Myopic-1 model.
Other Choice Models
We next present analogous results for the Last-n, hot Hand, and Exponential Smoothing models.
To facilitate comparison with the Gittins-index family of models described above, the figures include results for the Simple model as well.
Last-n
The left panel of Figure 4 shows that the BIC scores associated with the Last-n family of models tend hypothesis that Last-1 BIC > Simple BIC, was significant at nearly the 0.01 level, an analogous
Wilcoxon Signed Rank test returned a weaker p-value, of 0.111.
As the left panel suggests, however, subjects with lower Last-1 BIC scores are those for whom neither model fits very well. For example, for the 88 subjects for whom the Simple ranked first, the average Simple model's BIC score was 328.7, while for the 79 subjects for whom the Last-1 model ranked first, the analogous score was 392.4. In fact, in cumulative distribution of the 1st-ranking BIC scores, the Simple model also dominates Last-1.
Hot Hand Figure 5 details the BIC scores of the Hot Hand family of models. One sees that, in contrast to the Last-n model, the Hot Hand models' fit to subjects' choices improves with larger n. Note also that, within the Hot Hand family, the performance of the models is well-ordered. In both of Figure 5 's panels, HH-5 outperforms HH-3, and HH-3 outperforms HH-1. Indeed, while we do not report detailed results here, the results for HH-4 and HH-2 also fit within this ordering.
To better understand why the rankings appear to be ordered with n, we compared the models' BIC scores to subjects average run lengths. The results, shown in Figure 6 , are informative: the HH-5 model's BIC scores are strongly associated with average run length, with a nearly linear relationship between BIC andτ forτ ≤ 10. 14 Close inspection shows that a more attenuated form of the same type of relationship also holds for HH-3, and plots that include the results for the HH-2 and HH-4 models 14 To quantify the strength of the relationship, we also created a binary variable that took on a value of 1 for a subject show a consistent progression: the larger the n, the more strongly average run length is associated with low BIC scores. This leads us to question the quality of the Hot Hand model's fit to the data. Now suppose that in T trials a subject switches arms m times. If an HH-n with very large n is fit to the data, it will register roughly m inconsistencies, perhaps fewer. In turn, if m is small then the fit associated with the HH-n model will be very good, no matter what the relative winning probabilities of the two arms. Therefore, in a significant sense, the HH-n model may be obtaining good fits simply by picking up long run lengths, and we suspect that the BIC scores of HH-6, HH-7, etc. would keep improving.
As a simple test of this hypothesis, we tested a HH-∞ model that recommends never switching.
Its aggregate BIC score was 61,659, much lower than that of HH-5. Furthermore, as the plot of BIC onτ in Figure 6 confirms, HH-∞ displays a more extreme version of the pattern seen in the other Hot Hand models. Thus, we believe that the low BIC scores obtained by HH-5 are largely artifacts of subjects' long run lengths.
if HH-5 was ranked first and zero otherwise. Tests for the probability of HH-5 obtaining a 1 st ranking showed thatτ has, in fact, a significant positive impact. In a logit regression with an intercept, the coefficient forτ was positive with a t-statistic greater than 4.6. A similar probit regression returned the same direction and significance.
In contrast, there is some evidence against this phenomenon holding for all models. Analogous plots for the other models do not show the same strong relationship between BIC scores andτ . (See Appendix F.) Rather, BIC scores tend to be higher for small average run lengths and then drop for average run lengths aboveτ ≈ 7. Above this cutoff, there appears to be only a mild, negative relationship between the two. An exception to this general statement is the Last-1 model, whose BIC scores are best for subjects with very lowτ s. Again, these are the subjects who also have high BIC scores and whose switching behavior seems to be nearly random.
Exponential Smoothing
Lastly, Figure 7 compares the performance of Exponential Smoothing to that of the Simple and Hot Hand models. Simple, and ES-1 versus Simple -returned p-values that ranged from highly significant (less that 0.001) to vanishingly small. 15 The alternative hypotheses of these one-sided tests was that the model with the better rankings had a lower mean or median for its BIC scores.
Discussion
The HH-5 model appears to be fitting the data well simply by picking up longer run lengths. In con- On the whole, the Exponential Smoothing model appeals for a number of reasons. First, it appears to fit the data well. Furthermore, the special case of γ = 1 -which was excluded from consideration in our fit analysis -corresponds to a Last-1 model, so the model is (marginally) even more flexible that the results already indicate. Finally, we find the model's correspondence to a Bayesian model for
Markov-modulated rewards to be appealing. Even though we may model the world as being stationary it is not, and the ES models implicitly capture a belief that systems are always changing.
Conclusion
The multi-armed bandit is a canonical representation of customer learning and switching in response to sequences of uncertain outcomes. The complex prescriptions of rational choice models, however, make them analytically intractable, hence less-then-useful in the context of competitive analysis. This same intractability calls into question whether peoples' choices are consistent with such a rational model in the first place, and the results of previous experiments by Horowitz [22] , Meyer and Shi [30] and others have suggested simpler, myopic models of customer choice may be more accurate in predicting peoples' decisions in this type of setting.
In this paper, we have examined the descriptive ability of simple choice models in a bandit setting.
We first developed a hierarchy of Bayesian models that range widely in complexity, from the Gittinsindex model that most closely represents rational behavior, though the simpler Myopic model, to the Simple model in which the customer's view of a supplier is representative of a category. We then considered other well-known choice models: the Last-n models, which are limited-memory analogue of the Myopic model; the Hot Hand models which respond to sequences of losses on the current arm; and Exponential smoothing models, which take simple weighted averages of current and prior information. 16 For plots of BIC scores againstτ , see Appendix F, and for plots of BIC scores against free parameter value, see
We then performed two sets of analysis, each intended to test the correspondence between subjects'
behavior and the models' predictions. Our results may be of use in the larger task of building a positive theory of dynamic decision making, as described in Hutchinson and Meyer [24] . As Section 6 suggests, there may be segments of subjects, some of whose choices are more strongly guided by one model or another. Similarly, a
given subject may use more than one model or choice, perhaps shifting strategies over time. While we have not approached subjects' behavior in this fashion, the data exist and make the analysis possible.
Additional models, such as Q-learning, can also be tested, as can more exploratory approaches. A recent paper by Houser et al. [23] provides an exciting, new approach in this direction.
At the same time, there exist a number of limitations to our findings that bear repeating. First, while the experimental environment was essential for controlling the attributes of the arms and generating predictions, as in any experiment, the artificiality of setting may lead to behavior that differs from the way people solve real world bandit-like problems. More broadly, the bandit model, itself, may mis-specify the basis of customer choice, though this (of course) was not a modelling problem these experiments were intended to address. For example, it may not be reasonable to assume that the quality distributions of the arms set by suppliers are independent.
B Experiment Screen Shots
This appendix details the sequence of screens that a subject would see as she was taking the experiment.
The first page explains the procedure of doing the experiment on the web, the maximum amount of time subject may take between decisions (15 minutes), and the contact information in case anything goes wrong.
Welcome! In this exercise you will be making a series of choices, which will be presented to you in a sequence of web pages. Once you have made a given choice you cannot go back and change it. Thus, while you are completing the exercise, the 'back' button on your browser should not be used. Pressing that button will terminate the program. Once the program has terminated, you cannot rejoin or begin the exercise again.
If you proceed directly through the exercise with a fast internet connection, it should take you about 1 hour (slower connections will take longer). If you wish to take a short break between choices, you may, but the program is set to terminate in response to a delay of greater than 15 minutes. Once the program has terminated, you cannot rejoin or begin the exercise again.
You will be paid for your participation in cash. The amount of money you earn will depend on the choices you make, and will be paid to you after the exercise is completed, along with a fixed, $5 participation payment. You will need to bring your Penn ID and a printout of the last web page (the receipt) to Cynthia Anderson in the OPIM Suite in Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall (1300 SH-DH), Monday through Friday between 9am and 4pm in order to collect your money. Funding for this study was provided by various research organizations.
All of your responses are confidential and will be reported only in aggregate and anonymously. You will not be identified by name in any publication or presentations of results from this research. If you have questions or comments about the content of the exercise, send email to crosonr@wharton.upenn.edu.
Thank you again for your participation.
Webmaster email link
Continue with Instructions The second page detailed the decisions subjects would have to make throughout the experiment as well as the compensation scheme. Note that subjects are told that the ratio of cards may differ from deck to deck each session.
In this exercise you will play three sessions of a game in which you will be dealt a card from one of two different decks of cards. These are not normal playing cards, but instead have either YOU WIN or YOU LOSE printed on them.
The decision you will be making will be choosing between the two decks of cards. First you will click on the picture of one of the two decks of cards to choose it. The program will then shuffle the chosen deck, randomly select one card from that deck, and show you the selected card. If the card is a WIN card, you will win 10 points. If the card is a LOSE card, you will win no points. After you have seen the card that was chosen from the deck and the points have been added to your account, the card will be returned into the deck from which it came and you will again choose between the two decks to draw your next card.
The number of times you will choose between the two decks in each session has been randomly determined.
After each choice between two decks, the probability of the session ending is 1%, while with a 99% chance the session will continue, and you will be asked to choose between the same two decks again.
After the session ends by this random determination, we will change the two decks of cards to different decks. You will then play another session with the same rules and probabilities of ending and continuing. Following the second session the decks will again be replaced and a third session will be run. We will ask you to answer some questions describing your decisions between each session. After the third session ends, the exercise will be over. We will ask you to complete a post-experimental survey and to print a receipt page, which you will be able to exchange for your cash payment.
The ratio of WIN to LOSE cards may differ from deck to deck but always remains the same in the same-colored deck. While you will not be told the decks' composition, before each of the three sessions the program will show you some example cards drawn from the two decks you will use. In addition, at any time during a session you can view a history of the choices you made and their outcomes by pressing the HISTORY button located on the bottom left-hand side of your screen.
Points will accumulate over all three sessions, and the program will keep a running record of the total number of points you have earned during the exercise in your bank account shown underneath the pictures of the decks. All participants will earn a $5 participation fee, plus $1 for every 100 points in the account when the exercise ends. Thus the exact amount of money you earn will depend on the choices you make and the cards that appear.
Click on the button below to begin the exercise with some example draws from the first two decks.
Begin the Exercise (Example) Figure 9 : Screen Shot 2
The third page is the first screen of the actual experiment. Subjects are given three prior outcomes for each deck. The sixth page is a sample of the history that a subject had access to at any time during the experiment. Finally, the seventh page shows the message at the end of the first session along with a sample bank balance. 
C The Expected Switching Time
In this appendix we discuss results concerning the increasing and convex properties of the expected switching time, E[τ ]. We sketch results for several of the paper's models.
C.1 Gittins Index Model
Chang and Lai [8] develop approximations for the Gittins index, which are asymptotically optimal as α → 1. Expression (4.2) in [8] defines E[τ ] for a subject that uses the approximate index. It is not difficult to show that, when properly scaled (by ln(1 − α) −1 )), the expression is increasing and convex in the average quality of the current arm. See Gans [12] .
C.2 Simple Model
Gans [12] applies well-known results concerning random walks to analyze an asymptotic expression for E[τ ] when a subject uses the Simple model. Again, the paper's analysis shows that E[τ ] is increasing and convex in the average quality of the current arm.
C.3 Myopic Model
It is not difficult to show that a common version of the Myopic index has a random walk structure that yields to the analysis in [12] . To begin, let τ be the time at which such a subject switches from arm i to arm j, and let M i 0 and M 
C.4 Hot Hand Model
The switching time for the HH-n model occurs when there are exactly n consecutive failures on the current arm. Let T be the time of the first success when sampling from the current arm, and let p be the success probability of the arm. Then
(1 − p)
Solving for E[τ ] and simplifying, we have
Differentiation shows that E[τ ] is increasing and convex in p. We see also that E[τ ] = O 1 1−p n and is growing exponentially quickly for large n. In turn, 
